Name: Coercive Distribution (Elements in the Politics of Development) (en Inglés)
Price: 35390.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Albertus, Michael ; Fenner, Sofia ; Slater, Dan
ISBN: 9781108462136

portada Coercive Distribution (Elements in the Politics of Development) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Dan Slater

Michael Albertus

Sofia Fenner

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Año

2018

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.9 x 15.2 x 0.6 cm

Peso

0.16 kg.

ISBN13

9781108462136

N° edición

Categorías

Ciencias políticas

Coercive Distribution (Elements in the Politics of Development) (en Inglés)

Dan Slater (Autor) · Michael Albertus (Autor) · Sofia Fenner (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "Coercive Distribution (Elements in the Politics of Development) (en Inglés)"

Canonical theories of political economy struggle to explain patterns of distribution in authoritarian regimes. In this Element, Albertus, Fenner, and Slater challenge existing models and introduce an alternative, supply-side, and state-centered theory of 'coercive distribution'. Authoritarian regimes proactively deploy distributive policies as advantageous strategies to consolidate their monopoly on power. These policies contribute to authoritarian durability by undercutting rival elites and enmeshing the masses in lasting relations of coercive dependence. The authors illustrate the patterns, timing, and breadth of coercive distribution with global and Latin American quantitative evidence and with a series of historical case studies from regimes in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. By recognizing distribution's coercive dimensions, they account for empirical patterns of distribution that do not fit with quasi-democratic understandings of distribution as quid pro quo exchange. Under authoritarian conditions, distribution is less an alternative to coercion than one of its most effective expressions.