Name: Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan (Studies of the Walter h. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) (en Inglés)
Price: 40210.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Daniel M. Smith
ISBN: 9781503613614

portada Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan (Studies of the Walter h. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Stanford Univ Pr

Autor

Daniel M. Smith

Año

2020

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

384

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9781503613614

N° edición

Categorías

La democracia

Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan (Studies of the Walter h. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) (en Inglés)

Daniel M. Smith (Autor) · Stanford Univ Pr · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Dynasties and Democracy: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in Japan (Studies of the Walter h. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center) (en Inglés)"

Although democracy is, in principle, the antithesis of dynastic rule, families with multiple members in elective office continue to be common around the world. In most democracies, the proportion of such "democratic dynasties" declines over time, and rarely exceeds ten percent of all legislators. Japan is a startling exception, with over a quarter of all legislators in recent years being dynastic. In Dynasties and Democracy, Daniel M. Smith sets out to explain when and why dynasties persist in democracies, and why their numbers are only now beginning to wane in Japan-questions that have long perplexed regional experts. Smith introduces a compelling comparative theory to explain variation in the presence of dynasties across democracies and political parties. Drawing on extensive legislator-level data from twelve democracies and detailed candidate-level data from Japan, he examines the inherited advantage that members of dynasties reap throughout their political careers-from candidate selection, to election, to promotion into cabinet. Smith shows how the nature and extent of this advantage, as well as its consequences for representation, vary significantly with the institutional context of electoral rules and features of party organization. His findings extend far beyond Japan, shedding light on the causes and consequences of dynastic politics for democracies around the world.