Name: Getting the Command and Control Right: A Vietnam Case Study (en Inglés)
Price: 21830.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col
ISBN: 9781503163782

portada Getting the Command and Control Right: A Vietnam Case Study (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Editorial

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28.0 x 21.6 x 0.3 cm

Peso

0.17 kg.

ISBN13

9781503163782

Categorías

Vietnam
Guerra de vietnam - (c. 1955-c. 1975)
Conflictos tras iigm

Getting the Command and Control Right: A Vietnam Case Study (en Inglés)

U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col (Autor) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Getting the Command and Control Right: A Vietnam Case Study (en Inglés)"

This book is a study of the complicated problem of command and control in modern warfare. The challenges of command and control during the Vietnam War provide the basis for the exploration of an enduring matter of concern to military professionals. The goal of achieving unity of command is inextricably linked to the creation of a clear and logical command structure. Getting the command and control right is a precept on which military professionals pride themselves. A clear command structure ultimately enables military formations to synchronize actions towards a common aim or objective. This book analyzes the U.S. military's transition from advisory to offensive operations during the Vietnam War, specifically focusing on command structures and their impact on the synchronization of tactical actions. Despite an already complex situation brought about through hybrid warfare, policy-makers and senior commanders compounded the complexity of the war by establishing inadequate command arrangements. The result was a piecemeal application of military power remiss of operational coherence. This book explores the degree to which problems in command and control frustrated the synchronization of tactical actions.