Name: No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan war (en Inglés)
Price: 102830.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Michael R. Fenzel
ISBN: 9780804798181

portada No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan war (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Stanford Security Studies

Autor

Michael R. Fenzel

Año

2017

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

192

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9780804798181

N° edición

Categorías

Historia militar

No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan war (en Inglés)

Michael R. Fenzel (Autor) · Stanford Security Studies · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "No Miracles: The Failure of Soviet Decision-Making in the Afghan war (en Inglés)"

The Soviet experience in Afghanistan provides a compelling perspective on the far-reaching hazards of military intervention. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev decided that a withdrawal from Afghanistan should occur as soon as possible. The Soviet Union's senior leadership had become aware that their strategy was unraveling, their operational and tactical methods were not working, and the sacrifices they were demanding from the Soviet people and military were unlikely to produce the forecasted results. Despite this state of affairs, operations in Afghanistan persisted and four more years passed before the Soviets finally withdrew their military forces. In No Miracles, Michael Fenzel explains why and how that happened, as viewed from the center of the Soviet state. From that perspective, three sources of failure stand out: poor civil-military relations, repeated and rapid turnover of Soviet leadership, and the perception that Soviet global prestige and influence were inexorably tied to the success of the Afghan mission. Fenzel enumerates the series of misperceptions and misjudgments that led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, tracing the hazards of their military intervention and occupation. Ultimately, he offers a cautionary tale to nation states and policymakers considering military intervention and the use of force.