Name: Online and Matching-Based Market Design (en Inglés)
Price: 82700.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Echenique, Federico ; Immorlica, Nicole ; Vazirani, Vijay V.
ISBN: 9781108831994

portada Online and Matching-Based Market Design (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Echenique, Federico ; Immorlica, Nicole ; Vazirani, Vijay V.

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

742

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

25.6 x 17.6 x 4.4 cm

Peso

1.47 kg.

ISBN13

9781108831994

N° edición

Categorías

Tecnología de la información: cuestiones generales

Online and Matching-Based Market Design (en Inglés)

Echenique, Federico ; Immorlica, Nicole ; Vazirani, Vijay V. (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Dura

Libro Físico

$ 82.700

$ 137.840

Ahorras: $ 55.140

40% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Reino Unido (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Miércoles 12 de Junio y el Viernes 21 de Junio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Online and Matching-Based Market Design (en Inglés)"

The rich, multi-faceted and multi-disciplinary field of matching-based market design is an active and important one due to its highly successful applications with economic and sociological impact. Its home is economics, but with intimate connections to algorithm design and operations research. With chapters contributed by over fifty top researchers from all three disciplines, this volume is unique in its breadth and depth, while still being a cohesive and unified picture of the field, suitable for the uninitiated as well as the expert. It explains the dominant ideas from computer science and economics underlying the most important results on market design and introduces the main algorithmic questions and combinatorial structures. Methodologies and applications from both the pre-Internet and post-Internet eras are covered in detail. Key chapters discuss the basic notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives, and the way market design seeks solutions guided by normative criteria borrowed from social choice theory.