Name: Strategy in Crisis: The Pacific War, 1937-1945 (en Inglés)
Price: 46660.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Kuehn, John T.
ISBN: 9781682477656

portada Strategy in Crisis: The Pacific War, 1937-1945 (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

John T. Kuehn

Editorial

US Naval Institute Press

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

240

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Dimensiones

21.8 x 16.0 x 2.8 cm

Peso

0.43 kg.

ISBN13

9781682477656

Categorías

Estrategia militar para la defensa
Historia militar

Strategy in Crisis: The Pacific War, 1937-1945 (en Inglés)

John T. Kuehn (Autor) · US Naval Institute Press · Tapa Dura

Libro Físico

$ 46.660

$ 84.830

Ahorras: $ 38.170

45% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Miércoles 19 de Junio y el Lunes 01 de Julio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Strategy in Crisis: The Pacific War, 1937-1945 (en Inglés)"

The Pacific War (1937-1945) remains a crucial topic for strategic discussion, especially as Japan's push for a broader conflict in 1941 still fascinates historians. That regional push grew into a wider world war with all the major maritime powers, as well as the Soviet Union, in a conflict which challenged the allied response in Asia and beyond. John T. Kuehn examines the Pacific War from the vantage point of strategy and the execution of that strategy. The allies entered an ongoing Sino-Japanese War in China (1937-1945) which shaped the implementation of strategic decision making for the larger campaigns of The Pacific War. The Pacific War is often regarded as a conflict between the United States and Japan, but it involved a far greater cast of national characters, and the strategic calculations of these actors are addressed by the author in concise detail. The actions of the powers, such as the Dutch, British, Australians, New Zealanders, and the Soviet Union as well as the two primary nations, the U.S. and Empire of Japan, are considered through the strategic paradigm. The author, looking at the strategy of Imperial Japan as well as that of the U.S., concludes that the Axis failures in terms of coalition strategy continued throughout the war, even as the Allies strengthened coalition warfare along fronts.