Name: The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy (en Inglés)
Price: 21810.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: United States Air Force
ISBN: 9781502923851

portada The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Air Force

Editorial

Createspace Independent Publishing Platform

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

27.9 x 21.6 x 0.2 cm

Peso

0.12 kg.

ISBN13

9781502923851

Categorías

Negociación y control del armamento

The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy (en Inglés)

United States Air Force (Autor) · Createspace Independent Publishing Platform · Tapa Blanda

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "The Trilateral Force: The Atlantic Alliance and the Future of Nuclear Weapons Strategy (en Inglés)"

The United States seems trapped in the policy paradox of desiring continued nuclear arms reductions while recognizing the current reality of needing to maintain a robust nuclear arms deterrent. How far can the United States decrease its nuclear weapons stockpile and still maintain the required effective deterrent? How many nuclear weapons are enough? In the future, only through nuclear coalition operations can the United States continue to meet its national security commitments at minimum deterrence levels. A proposed Trilateral Force is a viable means of maintaining a Nuclear Triad capable of meeting extended deterrence security commitments, while preserving strategic stability at the lowest possible nuclear arsenal levels, at the least cost and greatest efficiency. A Trilateral Force structure bridges seemingly opposing requirements of national security. It allows the United States to incrementally and continually reduce its nuclear arsenal in pursuit of arms reduction goals, preserving operational capability and strategic stability among the world's nuclear powers, while maintaining a credible minimal deterrence posture. By linking an increase in nuclear coalition operations to a decrease in nuclear arsenals, the United States can bridge the gap between the desire for global zero and the need to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent.