Name: Waging War, Planning Peace: U. S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (en Inglés)
Price: 59820.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Aaron Rapport
ISBN: 9780801456619

portada Waging War, Planning Peace: U. S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cornell University Press

Autor

Aaron Rapport

Año

2015

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

280

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9780801456619

N° edición

Categorías

Estrategia militar para la defensa
Historia militar

Waging War, Planning Peace: U. S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (en Inglés)

Aaron Rapport (Autor) · Cornell University Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

$ 59.820

$ 108.770

Ahorras: $ 48.950

45% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Jueves 20 de Junio y el Martes 02 de Julio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Waging War, Planning Peace: U. S. Noncombat Operations and Major Wars (Cornell Studies in Security Affairs) (en Inglés)"

As the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology―specifically, construal level theory―can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future.In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.