Name: A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941 1945 (en Inglés)
Price: 58740.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Xiaoyuan Liu
ISBN: 9780521528559

portada A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941 1945 (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Xiaoyuan Liu

Año

2002

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

364

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN

0521528550

ISBN13

9780521528559

Categorías

Siglo xx - c. 1900-c. 1999
Historia general y del mundo

A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941 1945 (en Inglés)

Xiaoyuan Liu (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

$ 58.740

$ 117.470

Ahorras: $ 58.730

50% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: España (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Miércoles 26 de Junio y el Miércoles 03 de Julio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "A Partnership for Disorder: China, the United States, and Their Policies for the Postwar Disposition of the Japanese Empire, 1941 1945 (en Inglés)"

A Partnership for Disorder examines American-Chinese foreign policy planning in World War II for decolonising the Japanese Empire and controlling Japan after the war. This study unravels some of the complex origins of the postwar upheavals in Asia by demonstrating how the US and China's disagreements on many concrete issues prevented their governments from forging an effective partnership. The two powers' quest for long-term cooperation was further complicated by Moscow's eleventh-hour involvement in the Pacific War. By the war's end, a triangular relationship among Washington, Moscow, and Chongqing surfaced from secret negotiations at Yalta and Moscow. Yet the Yalta-Moscow system in Asia proved too ambiguous and fragile to be useful even for the purpose of defining a new balance of power among the Allies. The failure of the system was compounded by its obliviousness to Asia's dynamic nationalist forces.