Name: a theory of the firm,governance, residual claims, and organizational forms (en Inglés)
SKU: 1675797
Price: 52510.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Jensen, Michael C.
ISBN: 9780674012295

portada a theory of the firm,governance, residual claims, and organizational forms (en Inglés)

a theory of the firm,governance, residual claims, and organizational forms (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Michael C. Jensen

Editorial

Harvard University Press

Idioma

Inglés

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

23.4x15.6x2.3 cm

Peso

0.34 kg.

ISBN

0674012291

ISBN13

9780674012295

Categorías

Teoría y filosofía económicas
Gestión: liderazgo y motivación
Teoría y comportamiento organizativos

a theory of the firm,governance, residual claims, and organizational forms (en Inglés)

Michael C. Jensen (Autor) · Harvard University Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 16 a 21 días háb.

$ 95.480$ 52.510

-45%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo

Quedan 100 unidades

$ 52.510

Llega entre el 13 Oct y el 20 Oct a Santiago, Región Metropolitana. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "a theory of the firm,governance, residual claims, and organizational forms (en Inglés)"

This collection examines the forces, both external and internal, that lead corporations to behave efficiently and to create wealth. Corporations vest control rights in shareholders, the author argues, because they are the constituency that bear business risk and therefore have the appropriate incentives to maximize corporate value. Assigning control to any other group would be tantamount to allowing that group to play poker with someone else's money, and would create inefficiencies. The implicit denial of this proposition is the fallacy of the so-called stakeholder theory of the corporation, which argues that corporations should be run in the interests of all stakeholders. This theory offers no account of how conflicts between different stakeholders are to be resolved, and gives managers no principle on which to base decisions, except to follow their own preferences. In practice, shareholders delegate their control rights to a board of directors, who hire, fire, and set the compensation of the chief officers of the firm. However, because agents have different incentives than the principals they represent, they can destroy corporate value unless closely monitored. This happened in the 1960s and led to hostile takeovers in the market for corporate control in the 1970s and 1980s. The author argues that the takeover movement generated increases in corporate efficiency that exceeded $1.5 trillion and helped to lay the foundation for the great economic boom of the 1990s.