Name: Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off (en Inglés)
SKU: 57523926
Price: 25380.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Federal Trad Commission
ISBN: 9781502739537

portada Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off (en Inglés)

Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Federal Trad Commission

Editorial

Createspace

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

28x21.6x0.2 cm

Peso

0.10 kg.

ISBN13

9781502739537

Categorías

Empresa y gestión

Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off (en Inglés)

Federal Trad Commission (Autor) · Createspace · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off (en Inglés)"

A basic tenet of incentive theory states that there is a trade-off between risk and incentives. By implication, greater variation in firm profits leads to a reduction in the use of profit sharing. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence for this relationship. This book reexamines the difference between the theoretical prediction and the empirical evidence, and shows that the key is agent discretion over task choice. A theoretical model represents agent discretion as an adverse selection problem. This model guides the empirical analysis of contracts given to employees in British manufacturing firms. For employees without discretion over the tasks they perform, there is a negative relationship between variation in firm profits and the use of profit sharing. For employees with discretion, there is a positive relationship.