Name: Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium (en Inglés)
Price: 58280.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Peivandi, Ahmad ; Rezaei, Mohammad Abbas ; Subramanian, Ajay
ISBN: 9781952751967

portada Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

Ahmad Peivandi

Mohammad Abbas Rezaei

Ajay Subramanian

Editorial

Eliva Press

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.9 x 15.2 x 0.4 cm

Peso

0.10 kg.

ISBN13

9781952751967

Categorías

Finanzas

Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium (en Inglés)

Ahmad Peivandi (Autor) · Mohammad Abbas Rezaei (Autor) · Ajay Subramanian (Autor) · Eliva Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

$ 58.280

$ 80.940

Ahorras: $ 22.660

28% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Lunes 05 de Agosto y el Jueves 15 de Agosto.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Aggregate Risk, Bank Competition and Regulation in General Equilibrium (en Inglés)"

We examine the optimal design of bank regulation in a general equilibrium model. The benchmark unregulated economy has a unique equilibrium in which banks are maximally leveraged and financed entirely via inside equity and deposits. We characterize the efficient allocation and show that the unregulated economy underinvests (overinvests) in risky production when aggregate risk is low (high). We carry out a normative analysis by showing how the efficient allocation can be implemented via capital and reserve requirements, deposit insurance and bailouts. There is a range of efficient regulatory policies with a stricter capital requirement on banks being accompanied by a looser reserve requirement and less deposit insurance. Capital and reserve requirements become stricter as aggregate risk increases. Depositor subsidies are efficient if aggregate risk is below a threshold. When aggregate risk exceeds the threshold, it is efficient to subsidize productive firms by levying taxes (in expectation) on bank depositors and equityholders.