Name: Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese way of War, 1961-1974: The Portugese way of War, 1961-74 (Contributions in Military Studies) (en Inglés)
Price: 130540.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: John P. Cann
ISBN: 9780313301896

portada Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese way of War, 1961-1974: The Portugese way of War, 1961-74 (Contributions in Military Studies) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Praeger

Autor

John P. Cann

Año

1997

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

240

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

Peso

ISBN

0313301891

ISBN13

9780313301896

N° edición

Categorías

África
Historia de africa

Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese way of War, 1961-1974: The Portugese way of War, 1961-74 (Contributions in Military Studies) (en Inglés)

John P. Cann (Autor) · Praeger · Tapa Dura

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Reseña del libro "Counterinsurgency in Africa: The Portuguese way of War, 1961-1974: The Portugese way of War, 1961-74 (Contributions in Military Studies) (en Inglés)"

The first comprehensive account in English of how the Portuguese Armed Forces prepared for and conducted a distant counterinsurgency campaign in its African possessions with very limited resources, choosing to stay and fight despite the small odds for success. The Portuguese military crafted its doctrine and implemented it to match the guerrilla strategy of protracted war, and in doing so, followed the lessons gleaned from the British and French experiences in small wars. The Portuguese approach to the conflict was distinct in that it sought to combine the two-pronged national strategy of containing the cost of the war and of spreading the burden to the colonies with the solution on the battlefield. It describes how Portugal defined and analyzed its insurgency problem in light of the available knowledge on counterinsurgency, how it developed its military policies and doctrines in this context, and how it applied them in the African colonial environment. The uniqueness of its approach is highlighted through a thematic military analysis of the Portuguese effort and a comparison with the experiences of other governments fighting similar contemporaneous wars.