Name: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of Regulatory Policy (en Inglés)
SKU: 59869815
Price: 26250.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Kupiec, Paul H. ; O'Brien, James M. ; United States Federal Reserve Board
ISBN: 9781288721481

portada Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of Regulatory Policy (en Inglés)

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of Regulatory Policy (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Federal Reserve Board

Paul H. Kupiec

James M. O'Brien

Editorial

Bibliogov

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

24.6x18.9x0.3 cm

Peso

0.11 kg.

ISBN13

9781288721481

Categorías

Política y gobierno

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of Regulatory Policy (en Inglés)

United States Federal Reserve Board (Autor) · Paul H. Kupiec (Autor) · James M. O'Brien (Autor) · Bibliogov · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Deposit Insurance, Bank Incentives, and the Design of Regulatory Policy (en Inglés)"

This study analyzes alternative bank regulatory polices within a theoretical framework that can encompass many policy design issues. Consequences of generalizing banks' investment and financing opportunities for results in the existing literature are examined. Under costless equity issuance, a narrow banking requirement costlessly resolves moral hazard and insurance pricing problems addressed in the literature. With costly equity, minimum capital requirements can be effective but optimal policy design is complicated by its dependence on equity issuance costs, heterogenous bank investment opportunities, and the information requirements these dependencies create. Incentive compatible policy mechanisms appear limited in their ability to resolve the information problems.