Name: International Finance Discussion Papers: External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms (en Inglés)
SKU: 59871810
Price: 30190.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Ellul, Andrew ; United States Federal Reserve Board ; Et Al
ISBN: 9781288727087

portada International Finance Discussion Papers: External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms (en Inglés)

International Finance Discussion Papers: External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Federal Reserve Board

Andrew Ellul

Editorial

Bibliogov

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

24.6x18.9x0.3 cm

Peso

0.13 kg.

ISBN13

9781288727087

Categorías

Política y gobierno

International Finance Discussion Papers: External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms (en Inglés)

United States Federal Reserve Board (Autor) · Andrew Ellul (Autor) · Bibliogov · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "International Finance Discussion Papers: External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms (en Inglés)"

We investigate the impact of family blockholders on the firm's debt agency costs under different investor protection environments. On one hand, families--through their undiversified investments, inter-generation presence, and reputation concerns--can mitigate debt agency costs. On the other hand, families--through their unique power position that can lead to private benefits extraction and higher bankruptcy risk--can exacerbate debt agency costs. The actual impact can go either way and what matters should be the creditors' protection environment. Using international bond issues from 1995 to 2000 for 1,072 international firms originating from 24 different countries, we find that family firms originating from low investor protection environments suffer from higher debt costs compared to non-family firms, while family firms originating from high investor protection environments benefit from lower debt costs compared to non-family firms. We find no impact from non-family blockholdings. These results are robust to various specifications and confirmed by an out-of-sample test using bonds issued by U.S. and foreign firms listed in the U.S. originating from 27 different countries.