Name: Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (Springerbriefs in Philosophy) (en Inglés)
Price: 65750.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Luca Moretti
ISBN: 9783030433918

portada Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (Springerbriefs in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (Springerbriefs in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Springer

Autor

Luca Moretti

Año

2020

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9783030433918

N° edición

Categorías

Filosofía: epistemología y teoría del conocimiento

Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (Springerbriefs in Philosophy) (en Inglés)

Luca Moretti (Autor) · Springer · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo Importado

Envío: 12 a 17 días háb.

$ 109.590$ 65.750

-40%

Costos de importación incluídos en el precio ✅

Libro Nuevo

Quedan más de 100 unidades

$ 65.750

Llega entre el 18 Ago y el 25 Ago a Santiago, Región Metropolitana. Seleccionar ubicación

Agregar a lista de deseos

Reseña del libro "Seemings and Epistemic Justification: How Appearances Justify Beliefs (Springerbriefs in Philosophy) (en Inglés)"

This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate on epistemic justification. According to phenomenal conservatism, non-inferential justification rests on seemings or appearances, conceived of as experiences provided with propositional content. Phenomenal conservatism states that if it appears to S that P, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has some justification for believing that P. This view provides the basis for foundationalism and many ordinary epistemic practices.This book sheds new light on phenomenal conservatism by assessing objections to it and examining epistemological merits and advantages attributed to it. In a nutshell, phenomenal conservatism is actually compatible with Bayesian reasoning, and it is unaffected by bootstrapping problems and challenges that appeal to the cognitive penetrability of perception. Nevertheless, appearance-based justification proves unstable or elusive and its anti-septical bite is more limited than expected. These difficulties could be surmounted if phenomenal conservatism were integrated with a theory of inferential justification. The book appeals to scholars and postgraduates in the field of epistemology and philosophy of mind who are interested in the rational roles of appearances.