Name: The Limits of Military Officers' Duty To Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective (en Inglés)
Price: 32910.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Atkinson, Robert E., Jr. ; Institute, Strategic Studies ; Army War College, U. S.
ISBN: 9781329783973

portada The Limits of Military Officers' Duty To Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective (en Inglés)

The Limits of Military Officers' Duty To Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

U. S. Army War College

Strategic Studies Institute

Robert E. Atkinson

Editorial

Lulu.com

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

22.9 x 15.2 x 0.4 cm

Peso

0.12 kg.

ISBN13

9781329783973

Categorías

Enciclopedias y obras de consulta

The Limits of Military Officers' Duty To Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective (en Inglés)

U. S. Army War College (Autor) · Strategic Studies Institute (Autor) · Robert E. Atkinson (Autor) · Lulu.com · Tapa Blanda

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Reseña del libro "The Limits of Military Officers' Duty To Obey Civilian Orders: A Neo-Classical Perspective (en Inglés)"

This monograph offers a neo-classically republican perspective on a perennial problem of civilian/military relations: limitations on military officers' obligation to obey civilian authorities. All commentators agree that military officers are generally obliged-morally, professionally, and legally-to obey civilian orders, even as they agree that this rule of obedience has exceptions. Commentators tend to differ, however, on the basis and breadth of these exceptions. Following Samuel Huntington's classic analysis in The Soldier and the State, Mr. Robert Atkinson shows that disagreement about the breadth of the exceptions tends to assume that their bases-moral, professional, and legal-are incommensurable. This monograph suggests, to the contrary, that all defensible exceptions to the rule of military obedience, like that rule itself, derive from a single neo-classical, Huntingtonian standard binding on civilian authorities and military officers alike: the common good.