Name: Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (en Inglés)
Price: 55370.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Phil Haun
ISBN: 9780804792837

portada Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Stanford Security Studies

Autor

Phil Haun

Año

2015

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

288

Encuadernación

Tapa Dura

ISBN13

9780804792837

N° edición

Categorías

Estrategia militar para la defensa
Historia militar

Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (en Inglés)

Phil Haun (Autor) · Stanford Security Studies · Tapa Dura

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Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

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Reseña del libro "Coercion, Survival, and War: Why Weak States Resist the United States (en Inglés)"

In asymmetric interstate conflicts, great powers have the capability to coerce weak states by threatening their survival―but not vice versa. It is therefore the great power that decides whether to escalate a conflict into a crisis by adopting a coercive strategy. In practice, however, the coercive strategies of the U.S. have frequently failed. In Coercion, Survival and War Phil Haun chronicles 30 asymmetric interstate crises involving the US from 1918 to 2003. The U.S. chose coercive strategies in 23 of these cases, but coercion failed half of the time: most often because the more powerful U.S. made demands that threatened the very survival of the weak state, causing it to resist as long as it had the means to do so. It is an unfortunate paradox Haun notes that, where the U.S. may prefer brute force to coercion, these power asymmetries may well lead it to first attempt coercive strategies that are expected to fail in order to justify the war it desires. He concludes that, when coercion is preferred to brute force there are clear limits as to what can be demanded. In such cases, he suggests, U.S. policymakers can improve the chances of success by matching appropriate threats to demands, by including other great powers in the coercive process, and by reducing a weak state leader's reputational costs by giving him or her face-saving options.