Name: Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927 (en Inglés)
Price: 33650.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Ramcharan, Rodney ; Raghuram, Rajan G. ; United States Federal Reserve Board
ISBN: 9781288698615

portada Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927 (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Autor

United States Federal Reserve Board

Rodney Ramcharan

Rajan G. Raghuram

Editorial

Bibliogov

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

Dimensiones

24.6 x 18.9 x 0.3 cm

Peso

0.11 kg.

ISBN13

9781288698615

Categorías

Política y gobierno

Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927 (en Inglés)

United States Federal Reserve Board (Autor) · Rodney Ramcharan (Autor) · Rajan G. Raghuram (Autor) · Bibliogov · Tapa Blanda

Libro Nuevo

$ 33.650

$ 46.740

Ahorras: $ 13.090

28% descuento

Envío normal

Origen: Estados Unidos (Costos de importación incluídos en el precio)

Se enviará desde nuestra bodega entre el Lunes 24 de Junio y el Viernes 28 de Junio.

Lo recibirás en cualquier lugar de Chile entre 1 y 3 días hábiles luego del envío.

Reseña del libro "Finance and Economics Discussion Series: Constituencies and Legislation: The Fight Over the McFadden Act of 1927 (en Inglés)"

The McFadden Act of 1927 was one of the most hotly contested pieces of legislation in U.S. banking history, and its influence was still felt over half a century later. The act was intended to force states to accord the same branching rights to national banks as they accorded to state banks. By uniting the interests of large state and national banks, it also had the potential to expand the number of states that allowed branching. Congressional votes for the act therefore could reflect the strength of various interests in the district for expanded banking competition. We find congressmen in districts in which landholdings were concentrated (suggesting a landed elite), and where the cost of bank credit was high and its availability limited (suggesting limited banking competition and high potential rents), were significantly more likely to oppose the act. The evidence suggests that while the law and the overall regulatory structure can shape the financial system far into the future, they themselves are likely to be shaped by well organized elites, even in countries with benign political institutions.