Name: game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups (en Inglés)
Price: 179310.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: sloof
ISBN: 9780792382300

portada game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

springer publishing map

Autor

sloof

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

280

ISBN

0792382307

ISBN13

9780792382300

Categorías

Teoría y filosofía de la economía

game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups (en Inglés)

Sloof (Autor) · springer publishing map · Libro Físico

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Reseña del libro "game-theoretic models of the political influence of interest groups (en Inglés)"

this volume starts with an overview of the results obtained from empirical models of the political influence of interest groups. it is observed that, by and large, interest groups affect public policy significantly. moreover, the empirical results indicate that interest groups use several means of influence that may differ in their effectiveness, and between which interaction effects may occur. theoretical models analyzing the choice of an interest group between different means of influence are relatively scarce, though. the three game-theoretic models presented in the main part of this volume are meant to help fill this gap. first, the choice of an interest group between campaign contributions and direct endorsements to influence voter behavior is investigated. second, the choice between using `words (lobbying) and using `actions (pressure) in influencing a policymaker is analyzed. third, the question is addressed at what level of government an interest group should direct its lobbying activities. also in this third model, the problem faced by politicians as to when to delegate policy authority to bureaucrats is studied within the context of interest group influence. the theoretical predictions obtained from the models are evaluated in the light of existing empirical evidence.