Name: More is Less: Why Parties may Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics) (en Inglés)
Price: 31750.00 CLP
Availability: InStock
Author: Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Oliver Hart
ISBN: 9781009396073

portada More is Less: Why Parties may Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics) (en Inglés)

Formato

Libro Físico

Editorial

Cambridge University Press

Autor

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Oliver Hart

Idioma

Inglés

N° páginas

Encuadernación

Tapa Blanda

ISBN13

9781009396073

More is Less: Why Parties may Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics) (en Inglés)

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Oliver Hart (Autor) · Cambridge University Press · Tapa Blanda

Libro Físico

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Reseña del libro "More is Less: Why Parties may Deliberately Write Incomplete Contracts (Elements in Law, Economics and Politics) (en Inglés)"

Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event ', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.