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WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY LEARN FROM HISTORY? RECOVERY FROM a STRATEGY DEFICIT (en Inglés)
Colin S. Gray
(Autor)
·
Strategic Studies Instutite
(Autor)
·
Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
· Tapa Blanda
WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY LEARN FROM HISTORY? RECOVERY FROM a STRATEGY DEFICIT (en Inglés) - Instutite, Strategic Studies ; Gray, Colin S. ; College, United States Army War
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Origen: Estados Unidos
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Reseña del libro "WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. ARMY LEARN FROM HISTORY? RECOVERY FROM a STRATEGY DEFICIT (en Inglés)"
What is commonly known as history is really the past, as it is often selected and preserved both by professional historians and by non-specialist citizens. The past is such a large and diverse repository of happenings, thoughts, and experiences that it requires treatment with a disciplined respect. Frequently, respect for the truth about the past is a victim of contemporary circumstance. In this monograph, Dr. Colin S. Gray seeks to explore how historical data might best be used for the benefit of the U.S. Army and, therefore, the United States. He pulls no punches in explaining how challenging it is to penetrate the fog that obscures much of the past. Since the future cannot be foreseen reliably, we are left rather uncomfortably with a seemingly ever changing today. Despite the difficulties that are soon found by efforts to identify lessons from history, Dr. Gray does believe there are a few major precepts to which respectful attention should be paid. For example, he states and argues in this monograph that the decision to wage war is always a gamble, despite the many advantages owned by the United States in most circumstances. In particular, thinking especially of such unhappy protracted episodes as the conduct of warfare in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the work is impressed by the extent and depth of the American lack of knowledge and understanding of combat zones. The author hopes that this modest study will help American soldiers cope with the huge scope and mass of potential data from the relevant past. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press
